Hedge funds are secretive products whose quality is difficult to ascertain in advance of investment. We examine two views of past work experience as predictors of hedge fund manager pedigree. In one, sector specific (hedge fund) work experience is positively related to performance. In the other, related industry (mutual funds, prime brokerages, custodian firms and securities brokerages) experience correlates with superior performance. Overall, aspects of specific and generally related industry experience appear important in signaling hedge fund quality. Funds whose management team possesses past hedge fund experience report superior performance. However, diversifying across experience types in a fund has no impact on returns. Hedge fund manager teams with prime brokerage and custodian experience along both proportional and diversity dimensions experience higher survival probabilities. 
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The hedge fund industry resembles market settings in which product quality matters but cannot be ascertained by consumers in advance (Nelson (1970) ). Hedge funds are characterized by secrecy about their sources of returns (Glode and Green (2011) . At the same time, hedge fund firms must convince investors and information intermediaries such as analysts that their products are worthy of selection. That portfolio managers" abilities are only observed with considerable imprecision has led to a growing literature linking qualitative hedge fund attributes to performance (for example, operational risk in Brown et al. (2008 and 2012) . In this empirical article, we introduce the past employment background of a portfolio manager as a potential indicator of hedge fund performance. We ask whether differences in types of industry experience found in hedge fund management teams help explain the cross section of various measures of performance. This paper establishes new insights into the origins of hedge fund managers and how their pre-history relates to fund returns and survival.
Having worked in the same or closely related industry to one"s current job may result in better-aligned skill matching and valuable networks for some managers than those who have worked in unrelated industries, implying differences in expertise, investment opportunity sets, access to funding and information, etcetera, across firms. While the literature documents the prevalence of networks in financial markets, networks formed from past work experiences have largely escaped the attention of investment management researchers. Despite the fact that the vast majority of portfolio managers across all types of funds have work experience, little is known in the investments literature about the economic impact of employment history on managerial performance.
Our starting point is that hedge fund managers" performance persistence (see Jagannathan, Malanhov, and Novikov (2010) and Fung et al. (2008) ) can be attributed to knowledge which is transferrable when managers change jobs. In Glode and Green"s (2011) model the persistence of performance found in the hedge funds industry may be attributable to "strategies or techniques that could be expropriated by others if they were informed about them." We consider two views related to fund managers" human capital developed at previous employers that could be transferred to subsequent portfolio management roles in hedge funds. In one perspective, individuals transfer sector specific skills to their hedge fund employers. We refer to this view as the sector specific experience perspective. The theory literature allows for sector specific skill accumulation through learning by doing or previous work experience (see Dustmann and Meghir (2005) and Chang, Gomes and Schorfheide (2002) , for example). Empirical evidence shows inter-firm transfers of tacit knowledge through employees who change jobs (Almeida and Kogut, 1999) . Studies relating an individual"s prior work experience to performance in a subsequent job are scarce due to data limitations (Bertrand and Schoar 2003) . Dokko, Wilk and Rothbard"s (2009) work is among the few exceptions. In this paper we try to fill this gap by tracking the performance of managers with hedge fund industry experience. Fitting the sector specific hypothesis to our context, the skills required to differentiate managerial quality in the hedge fund market are specialized and therefore only experience obtained from other hedge funds will matter for all aspects of a manager"s performance, measured by returns and survival.
In another perspective, human capital may also be taken from previous employers in the form of general, transferable skills obtained while working in related industries (see Dustmann and Meghir"s (2005) theoretical exposition and the empirical studies reviewed by Bertrand (2009) ). We refer to this view as the related industry experience perspective. In our setting, we identify cases where individuals who subsequently became hedge fund managers obtained related industry experience working as mutual fund managers, employees of prime brokers and custodians, and as securities brokers. We also observe a holdout sample of managers who worked for firms such as industrial undertakings, whose activities are removed from portfolio investments.
We generate conjectures that are specific to the type of related industry experience.
Mutual fund experience is generally regarded to be closely related to hedge fund management as seen in mutual fund companies that concurrently manage hedge funds (Cici, Gibson and Mousawi (2010) and Nohel, Wang and Zheng (2010) ). We hypothesize that mutual fund management skills such as security picking are relevant for the outperformance and, indirectly, the survival of fund managers when they join hedge funds. Prime brokerage and custodian related experience may impact a manager"s subsequent performance and liquidation probabilities. Prime brokers provide financial, administrative and operational services to hedge funds. The services broadly include securities clearing, handling hedge funds" collateral, and providing finance. Custodians are institutions that traditionally provide the infrastructure and back office support for hedge funds. Custodians can also control the flow of capital to meet margin calls. In recent years, custodians have been encroaching into prime brokerage business. Hybrid "prime custodial" services, where one institution provides financing and lending for short positions and holds and services long assets, are now a common feature of the market. 1 We hypothesize experience in these services has a positive impact on a manager"s performance and survival in the hedge fund industry. The likely channel for this advantage is savings on securities and cash borrowing costs.
Based on studies of the day-to-day operations of hedge funds we also identify brokerage firm experience as being relevant to performance. Hedge funds keep close contacts with brokerage firms for "raw" investment ideas (Simon et al. (2010) To analyze the two perspectives on the influence of hedge fund managers" prehistory, we trace the career histories of almost 1,600 managers whose identities appear in two of the most prominent hedge fund databases -the Lipper TASS and Hedge Fund Research (HFR) databases. We then compare the performance of fund manager teams sharing our selected types of industry experience to those without such work histories. We also analyze the determinants of hedge fund liquidation probabilities conditioned on past manager experience and other fund characteristics.
Our unit of analysis needs to take into account the operational architecture of the portfolio management function in a typical hedge fund. In most hedge funds, portfolios are managed in teams. We therefore employ two variations of the team as our unit of analysis.
2 Arguably, there are other types of industry experience we omit that could be related to hedge fund management. Examples include bank trust, insurance company and REIT portfolio management. However, we experimented with different categories of experience and retained the ones that give the most reasonable coverage without compromising the power of our econometric analyses.
First, we compute the proportion of managers in a team belonging to each of our target types of past employment experience. Second, we adopt the Teachman (1980) entropy based index to measure diversity of hedge funds" managerial teams (see Jehn, Northcraft and Neale (1999) and Pelled, Eisenhardt and Xin (1999) for similar applications). Analyzing the fractional representation of an experience type in a team of hedge fund managers informs us whether it is the concentration of such skills that matters. In addition, we are also interested in whether diversity, measuring the spread of different types of experience, is important for fund performance. Our treatment of teams along lines of diversity based on previous experience is motivated by studies linking managerial diversity to performance in the mutual fund industry (see Bär, Kempf and Ruenzi (2011) on individual versus group decision making; and Bogan, Just and Dev (2011) on gender diversity, for example).
Our main findings are as follows. We show that peer hedge funds, mutual funds, prime brokerages, custodians and brokerage firms are the main producers of hedge fund managers. Some prime brokerage, custodian and securities brokerage employers continue to offer services to their past employers. Based on simple observations of managerial experience, an investor could surmise that funds whose managers have our selected types of related industry experience generally tend to be smaller and younger. Past hedge fund experience favors long/short strategies while managers with broader brokerage related (prime broker, custodial and securities broking) become relative value and event driven strategists.
Other notable features of the simple separation of fund managers on experience are that connected funds charge higher management fees but lower incentive fees.
Controlling for a variety of fund characteristics, we find that having a concentration of hedge fund and prime broker experience in a fund boosts performance. Particularly with regards to historical working links with hedge funds, experience gathered at the holding company level is appears to be as relevant as operating unit level experience for a manager"s future performance. On fund returns, increasing the diversity of past experience housed in a fund does not impact performance, suggesting that it is the concentration of specialized skill sets that matter.
We find that prime brokerage and custodian connections reduce the probability of fund liquidation. In this case, both the concentration and diversity of industry relevant experience are important for hedge fund welfare. These findings imply that through networks with their last places of employment, hedge fund managers are likely able to obtain preferential access to services such as securities and cash lending. However, these apparent benefits do not apply to continuing prime brokerage and custodial relationships between current hedge fund managers and their former employers. Likely, banking regulations applying to prime brokers and custodians serve as deterrents to less than arm"s length relationships in this regard.
This paper is closely related to several strands of the finance literature. First, the contribution of individual fund managers" characteristics on portfolio performance has since permeated the hedge fund literature (see, for example, Li, Zhang and Zhao, 2010) from the mutual fund literature (Cohen, Frazzini and Malloy (2008 ), Chevalier and Ellison (1999 ), and Khorana (1996 ). Our paper differs from these studies by considering past employment history instead of educational backgrounds and experience at the same firm as key managerial characteristics.
Second, a nascent literature is also concerned with the origins of hedge fund managers. To date, though, virtually all the studies in this category have targeted the mutual fund industry as the main source of talent for the hedge fund industry. Kostovetsky (2009) draws indirect inferences from the widening gap between old and young mutual fund managers coinciding with the rapid growth of the hedge fund industry to conjecture that there has been a brain drain from mutual funds to hedge funds. Nohel, Wang and Zheng ( Finally, our paper is related to the literature on the impact of business ties on investment managers" performance. For example, Hao and Yan (2011) and Reuter (2006) show that mutual funds affiliated to investment banks through institutional (investment banking) and brokerage (underwriting) relations, respectively, get preferential access to IPOs. Massa and Rehman (2008) provide evidence that return sensitive information on borrowing firms passes from the borrowers" banks to mutual funds they are affiliated with through informal channels such as personal contacts. In our paper, we consider both past and current affiliations through the job-change channel. The economic significance of networks developed from past interactions has been demonstrated in many financial markets. Historical school ties, for instance, give equity analysts an advantage when they have educational links to the companies they cover (Cohen, Frazzini and Malloy (2010) ). Similarly, in the mutual fund industry, Cohen, Frazzini and Malloy (2008) find that portfolio managers benefit from investing in stocks with which they share past educational relations at the board level. Being networked through common experience from past venture capital (VC) syndication arrangements improves VC fund performance (Hochberg, Ljungqvist and Lu (2007) ).
The remainder of the article is crafted as follows. In Section I we describe how we constructed the data set and provide summary statistics and univariate findings. The empirical design and results are presented in Section II. Section III concludes.
I. Constructing the Data Set
We utilize several sources of data to create a rich taxonomy of hedge fund managers" career histories and performance. First, we obtain hedge fund data from the Hedge Fund identified from discussions with hedge fund managers to be an authoritative listing. We then check the ownership of each firm and in this way identify those prime brokers related to fund managers in our sample. We follow a similar matching process of starting with authoritative directories for custodians (FINalternatives), mutual funds (CRSP mutual funds database) and securities brokerages (Ancerno -formerly known as Abel/Noser).
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Having discussed our main data sources, we are now ready to enumerate the main past employment relations targeted by our paper. First, we identify past employment at hedge funds as signifying sector specific knowledge. Second, we denote general experience that is relevant to hedge fund management. Four professions fall in this category: (1) mutual fund management, (2) prime brokerage, (3) custodial experience and (4) securities brokerage.
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Finally, we identify a group of fund managers with experience unrelated to any of our categories, for example, previous employment in an oil company. Table I To examine the heterogeneity of employment backgrounds within funds, we use the Teachman (1980) entropy based Diversity Index, a widely used measure in examining work diversity or, in general, the diversity of any group (see Jehn, Northcraft and Neale (1999) and
Pelled, Eisenhardt and Xin (1999)). The Diversity Index is estimated for each fund as:
where i is one of the six categories fund managers can belong to in their past employment, i.e.: prime brokers, custodian, brokerage firms, mutual funds, hedge funds or other industries.
The proportion of fund managers belonging to one category, pi, is computed to obtain the past employment diversity measure. For example, if there is one fund manager with mutual fund experience and one with a hedge fund company background, our past employment diversity index equals 0.69. we are able to examine any similarities or differences between our unique sample of hedge fund managers and the general population of managers. Comparing Panels A and B, we observe that both subsamples are roughly similar in terms of fund size and age, investment strategies (apart from long/short equity, fund of funds and relative value), management fee, style effect and fund excess returns. The salient differences between the two subsamples are that our sample hedge funds whose managers have specific and related general industry experience tend to have higher incentive fees in line with their high water mark provision, longer lockup periods, greater usage of leverage, and experience negative fund flows on average.
We subject differences between funds whose management composition differs by past work experience to simple difference in means tests in Table III based on averages of the nominated variables for the funds over the sample period. The results are arranged by type of industry sector experience in Panels A-E. For the reader"s convenience, Panel F summarizes the preceding panels. Panels C-E also report the findings on effects of selected industry sector experience that carry over to the current employment of hedge fund managers. An example of such a case is a prime broker that a hedge fund manager previously worked for and is contracted as a prime broker to the manager"s current fund. Focusing on past work experience at the Unit level, the tabulations show that funds whose managers have our industry experience of interest tend to be smaller and younger than unrelated experience funds with the exception of those with securities brokerage experience. This finding may be related to the age of the hedge fund industry itself. It is reasonable to conjecture that the first hedge fund managers emerged out of mutual funds and, as the hedge fund industry itself matured, individuals experienced in the sector began to move to other funds. However, we cannot preclude alternative explanations using these univariate results. For example, hedge fund working experience could be associated with high attrition rates. We subject such issues to multivariate analysis below.
The next salient feature of our findings concerns the impact of the nature of managerial experience on the distribution of fund styles. Hedge fund experience seems to result in specialization in long/short strategies. Managers with brokerage related (prime broker, custodial and securities broking) experience tend to favor relative value and event driven strategies. Hedge fund experience appears to discourage participation in event driven
and other non-mainstream (from a hedge fund industry perspective) styles among the individuals with such experience. Finally, all types of past connections seem to prepare managers to manage funds-of-funds but to avoid global macro strategies. The overall impression given by our findings with regards to style specialization is that would-be hedge fund managers tend to sort on sector specific experience when it comes to job preferences.
Our preliminary results also point to potentially interesting trends in terms of the implications of type of past experience on the financial health of funds managers control later on in their careers. Except for mutual fund unit experience, all other experience categories tend to reward hedge fund managers with higher management fees. However, there is also a consistent tendency for connected managers to charge lower incentive fees, suggesting there is a trade-off between higher ongoing management fees based on manager pedigree and higher at-risk compensation for managers deemed not to possess industry relevant experience. Industry experience generally reduces the chances of running consecutive losses which result in being "underwater" according to our definition of fund financial distress. The only exception in this regard is mutual fund unit experience. All forms of industry related employment pre-history generally result in lower lock-up periods as well as less reliance on opening funds to the public or high water marks. Perhaps surprisingly for prime brokerage and custodial backgrounds, industry relevant experience tends to lead to less reliance on leverage. We note though that securities borrowing might be captured in the long/short style favored by those with hedge fund experience. As well, our results might point to lower reliance on leverage in quantity terms, but cannot provide information on quality of leverage.
The type of experience that a hedge fund manager previously acquired also seems to relate to her subsequent performance. Prior experience with hedge funds as well as financial groups that house prime brokerage, custodial and equity broking units is associated with higher excess returns. On the other end we see evidence suggestive of former mutual fund managers performing worse than the rest.
In summary, our univariate findings seem to suggest the industry experience categories used in this paper are relevant in segregating hedge fund manager attributes.
Generally, the results vindicate the choice we made to count experience obtained from working in a holding company hosting units more directly involved in activities relevant to managing hedge funds.
II. Analysis
We present the results here in two subsections. We begin in Section II.A by analyzing the role of managers" employment history among other determinants of hedge fund performance. In Section II.B we examine whether past employment networks affect hedge fund survival probabilities.
A. Effects of Past Employment Connections on Hedge Fund Performance
To examine hedge fund performance we use Fung and Hsieh"s ( we attribute our main finding to the likely transfer of specialist hedge fund and prime brokerage skills from individuals" past employment. We therefore conclude that both industry specific and related industry forms of experience are relevant for subsequent career performance.
Our evidence does not support the conjecture that the channel through which benefits of managers" past employment history flow to hedge fund performance is diversity of top fund management"s experience. It is only the fractional representation of experience types that is relevant, not our Diversity Index. This result suggests that it is skill concentration, and not diversity of talents, that matters for hedge fund performance.
B. Effects of Past Employment Connections on Hedge Fund Liquidation and Survival
To examine the effects of past employment history on hedge fund survival, we utilize probit regression estimates of the determinants of fund liquidations. Specifically, we compare the probability of hedge fund liquidations for a sample of hedge funds that have industry relevant experience to those without. The majority of our independent variables are motivated from the existing literature such as Brown, Goetzmann and Park (2001) Underwater is a dummy variable indicating whether a fund has a negative cumulative return over the past 12 months. Leverage is a binary indicator denoted 1 if the use of leverage is permitted in the fund, and 0 otherwise. We hypothesize that leverage will be negatively associated with fund survival.
In a variation of the basic model described above, we include time fixed effects to control for time-varying market wide changes in the hedge fund industry as well as fund home country dummy variables to control for differences in the hedge fund industries of various countries. Standard errors are clustered across quarters as well as across hedge funds to correct for cross-sectional dependence in fund liquidations. As a robustness check, we examine hedge fund survival using a log-logistic model following Calomiris and Mason (2003) and Richardson and Troost (2009) . The main advantage of using this survival model is that it allows us to examine the same explanatory variables as employed in our probit models (since the model is flexible enough to permit the inclusion of data sampled and aggregated at different points in time and levels). The dependent variable in the log-logistic specification is the natural logarithm of the number of days until liquidation. We present the results of the log-logistic regressions alongside our probit results.
In Table V Overall, our findings suggest that connections with other financial institutions such as prime brokers, custodian and brokerage firms at holdings levels benefit hedge funds by improving their chances in surviving in a competitive hedge fund industry.
III. Conclusion
This paper examines the impact of an investment executive"s past employment experience on her subsequent performance as a hedge fund manager. While various forms of managerial social networks have received considerable attention from financial economists and the popular press, past employment has received virtually no systematic attention. We show that hedge fund managers mostly come from peer hedge funds, mutual funds, prime brokerages, custodians and brokerage firms. In a significant number of cases, we observe past employment links continuing to the provision of services to hedge fund managers by their managers" past prime brokerage, custodian and securities brokerage employers.
An investor making simple comparisons of those funds whose managers have experience in our selected related industry sectors would draw the following conclusions.
Funds employing managers with experience in other hedge funds as well closely related activities, including mutual fund, prime broker, custodian and securities brokerage firms, tend to be smaller and younger than those with non-related experience. Hedge fund experience seems to predict a manager"s specialization in long/short strategies. Managers with brokerage related (prime broker, custodial and securities broking) work experience tend to favor relative value and event driven strategies. All types of past connections seem to prepare managers to manage funds-of-funds but to avoid global macro strategies. Except for mutual fund experience, connected funds charge higher management fees but lower incentive fees, and experience lower incidences of distress (measured as consecutive losses). All forms of industry related employment pre-history result in lower lock-up periods as well as less reliance on opening funds to the public or high water marks. On performance, past employment in hedge funds as well as financial groups that house prime brokerage, custodial and securities broking units is associated with higher excess returns.
Controlling for a variety of fund characteristics, our findings show that having a concentration of hedge fund experience in a fund boosts performance. Mutual fund, prime broker and custodian experience also positively contributes to investor returns. The benefits of mutual fund and custodian experience are only discernible when the manager worked at the mutual fund or custodian holding company level. Increasing the diversity of past experience in a fund"s managerial team does not impact performance, suggesting that it is concentration of specialized skill sets that matters. Past prime brokerage and custodian connections reduce the probability of fund liquidation. In this case, both the concentration and diversity of industry relevant experience are important for hedge fund welfare.
There are a number of further related research questions we plan to pursue. We hope to explore whether the quality of managers" past employment matters. First, our findings call for further research on how investors interpret managerial biographical data. Second, we plan to segregate between types of former employers by pedigree measured by industry metrics such as ratings in professional publications. We suspect that being connected to a well established hedge fund, for example, will have better implications for a fund manager"s subsequent performance and appeal to investors, than experience gained at a short-lived startup. Third, we plan to examine transfers of employees between hedge funds. How does Table I Underwater is a binary indicator for funds that report a negative cumulative return over the previous 12 months. Leveraged is a binary indicator for funds allowed to employ leverage. Lockup Period is measured in months. Open To Public is a dummy (1 if a fund is open to public and 0 otherwise). High Water Mark is an indicator (1 if a high water mark provision is present and 0 otherwise). Style Effect is measured as the average flow for a particular category on monthly basis. Fund Excess Return is measured as fund monthly returns minus Treasury bill rate. Fund Flow is measured as the percentage change of net assets of the fund between the beginning and end of a month, net of investment returns and assuming flows are invested at the end of the period. The sample consists of hedge funds listed in HFR and Lipper TASS during the period 1994 to 2009. We trace the last employer of each hedge fund whose managers are identified primarily based primarily on biographies listed in the BarclayHedge Hedge Fund Directory and the Morningstar Direct database. A relationship between a fund manager and her former employer is at the "Unit" level where the manager worked directly under a hedge fund (HF), prime brokerage (PB), custodial (Cus), mutual fund (MF) or securities brokerage (Broker) unit, and at the "Holdco" level where a holding company or group is the previous employer. A "Current" relationship in Panels C-E is one where former prime broker, custodian and securities brokerage employers continue to offer services to hedge funds operated by their former employees. Panels A-E compare the characteristics of funds managed by 1,108 former employees of hedge funds, mutual funds, prime brokers, custodians, and brokerages, respectively to those who did not work in to a holdout sample of funds managed by 405 managers who worked in Other industries. Panel F summarizes the findings in Panels A-E. Fund characteristics are defined in Table II . ***, **, * denote statistical significance in the differences at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. The independent variables are: Size and Age (the natural logarithm of fund net assets and fund age), fund flows, standard deviation of monthly returns, fund"s alpha, Management Fee (measured as a percentage of assets under management), Incentive Fee (measured as a percentage of a fund"s upside above a specific threshold), Open To Public dummy (1 if a fund is open to public and 0 otherwise), High Water Mark dummy (1 if a high water market provision is present and 0 otherwise), Lockup Period (measured in months), Subscription Period (measured in days), Total Redemption Period which is the sum of redemption and advance notice periods (measured in days), and Team Size (number of fund managers in a fund). "FRAC_" is a qualifier denoting proportion of managers in a firm with particular industry (hedge fund (HF), prime brokerage (PB), custodian (CUS), and securities brokerage (BROKER)) experience at the unit or Holdco levels. Diversity is an entropy based measure of the variety of employment backgrounds present in a fund manager team. Standard errors are adjusted for autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity and we performed clustering at fund level. ***, **, * denote statistical significance in the differences at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
Model (a)
Model ( a) and (b) ) and log-logistic (Model (c) and (d)) regressions of hedge fund liquidations/ survival, in Panels A and B, respectively. The dependent variable in models (a) and (b) is a binary indicator that takes a value of unity if a hedge fund liquidates in a given month and zero otherwise. The dependent variable in Model (c) and (d) is the natural logarithm of the number of days until liquidation. Past returns are denoted r(-1) through r(-6). The variable LN(NAV) is the natural logarithm of hedge fund net asset value. StDev is fund risk proxied by the standard deviation of the previous twelve month"s returns. Fund Age (Age) is computed from the date of inception to the reporting date. Long/Short Equity, Fund of Funds, Global Macro, Relative Value and Event Driven are fund style classification dummy variables. Management Fees are a percentage of assets under management. Incentive Fees are a percentage of achieved returns. Underwater is a binary indicator of funds that report a negative cumulative return over the previous 12 months. Leverage denoted funds allowed to employ leverage. Team Size is the number of fund managers in a fund). ***, **, * denote statistical significance in the differences at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
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